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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Over time, it has been observed that Safety and Reliability have 
not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, 
inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive practices in 
executing each of these two disciplines.  It is imperative to 
address this situation to help Reliability and Safety disciplines 
improve their effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
The paper poses an important question to address, “Safety and 
Reliability – Are they unique or unisonous?”  To answer the 
question, the paper reviewed several most commonly used 
analyses from each of the disciplines, namely, FMEA, 
reliability allocation and prediction, reliability design 
involvement, system safety hazard analysis, Fault Tree 
Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment.  The paper 
pointed out uniqueness and unison of Safety and Reliability in 
their respective roles, requirements, approaches, and tools, and 
presented some suggestions for enhancing and improving the 
individual disciplines, as well as promoting the integration of 
the two.   
 
The paper concludes that Safety and Reliability are unique, but 
compensating each other in many aspects, and need to be 
integrated.  Particularly, the individual roles of Safety and 
Reliability need to be differentiated, that is, Safety is to ensure 
and assure the product meets safety requirements, goals, or 
desires, and Reliability is to ensure and assure maximum 
achievability of intended design functions.  With the integration 
of Safety and Reliability, personnel can be shared, tools and 
analyses have to be integrated, and skill sets can be possessed 
by the same person with the purpose of providing the best value 
to a product development. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Reliability, by definition, is the probability that a system or 
component performs its intended functions under specified 
operating conditions for a specified period of time [1-3].  More 
broadly, Reliability Engineering is an engineering discipline 
that deals with how to design, produce, ensure, and assure 
reliable products to meet pre-defined product functional 
requirements [1-3].  
 
Safety is defined as the freedom from those conditions that can 
cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of 
equipment or property, or damage to the environment [4-5].  
System Safety is defined as the application of engineering and 
management principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve 
acceptable mishap risk, within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness and suitability, time, and cost, throughout all 
phases of the product life cycle [4].   
 
It is obvious that from their definitions, Reliability and Safety 
serve different, though related, purposes.  However, it has been 
observed that, both in theory and in practice, Reliability and 
Safety often have not been clearly differentiated in terms of 
their roles, objectives, and approaches.  This creates some 
confusion, inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive 
practices in executing these two disciplines.  There is a need to 
address this issue for clarification, and also to define and 
develop methods and tools to integrate these two disciplines for 
better support of a product development.  
 
In this paper, we first review key objectives and tasks of 
Reliability and Safety, respectively, in Sections 2 and 3, which 
set the tone for the follow-on discussions of the uniqueness and 
unison of Reliability and Safety in Section 4.  In Section 5, we 
present some ideas and approaches to enhance and improve the 
two disciplines with distinctive and focused roles, better 
integration, and unique sets of skills and tools.     
2 RELIABILITY OVERVIEW 
Reliability, by its definition, is primarily addressing the 
achievability of a set of given design functions.  Therefore, by 
nature, reliability tasks are design-centric, that is, all reliability 
tasks start with design information at hand and finish with an 
evaluation about reliability of the design being analyzed.  
Typical reliability tasks include Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), or Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA), Critical Item List (CIL), reliability 
allocation and prediction, reliability involvement in design and 
development.  The following is a brief overview of these tasks. 
2.1 FMEA/FMECA/FMEA/CIL 
FMEA [6-7] is a bottom-up, inductive reliability analysis tool.  
It systematically analyzes a product’s design, element-by-
element, in terms of its failure definition (failure mode), the 
failure causes, and failure effects.  It starts from the basic 
product design definition which, during conceptual design, is a 
set of function designs, and during detailed design, is the list of 
the hardware or software components.  It inductively infers the 
system failures from the design presented.  The FMEA also 
addresses the failure cause control and requires mitigations in 
place to reduce the severity or the likelihood of the failure 
mode.  The FMEA evolves to be a FMECA when the 
probability of occurrence of each failure mode is estimated, 
allowing risk levels to be identified, ranked, and prioritized. 
Sometimes, RPN (risk prioritization number, which is the 
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product of likelihood, severity and detection scores of the 
failure mode) is used for failure mode ranking and 
prioritization.  Critical Items List (CIL) is an analysis that is 
performed on the high severity failure modes identified by 
FMEA.  It lists the measures that are required to eliminate or to 
reduce the likelihood of failure mode occurrence. Some typical 
CIL measures include design requirements, test requirements, 
manufacturing and quality requirements, and operation and 
field support requirements.  
 
One of the key ground rules of the FMEA or FMECA is “one 
basic element at a time,” that is, when analyzing Function or 
Component or Piece Part A, we assume all other interacting 
functions, components, piece parts, and interface conditions are 
per specifications (or we call “as-designed and as-built 
condition”).  This assumption is in line with design practice.  
For example, we don’t design a turbopump to accommodate an 
out-of-specification inlet condition.  This assumption greatly 
simplifies the FMEA thought process and makes the FMEA 
approach viable. Otherwise, it would drastically grow in 
complexity if all combinations of failures were examined.  But 
this simplification also leads to the limitation of the FMEA; that 
is, simultaneous and multiple failure mode causes and effects, 
and system interactions are usually not addressed in FMEA.  
2.2 Reliability Allocation and Prediction (RAP) 
RAP brings reliability analysis from qualitative, such as failure 
mode identification, to quantitative, such as quantifying the 
probability of the failure modes and failure scenarios. There are 
many RAP modeling techniques and methods defined by 
military standards, reliability text books, and literature articles 
[9-11].  The primary purposes of RAP are to derive numerical 
reliability requirements to guide the product Design-For-
Reliability effort, assess the product’s reliability and provide 
reliability data to assist design trades and design optimization, 
and document RAP results to assure compliance with customer 
requirements or realization of program reliability goals.   
 
The key task of RAP is the quantification of reliability, defined 
as the probability that a system or component performs the 
intended functions under a set of specified operational 
conditions for a specified period of time.  The most widely used 
reliability prediction method is reliability block diagram 
(RBD).  Each block in the RBD can be a function block or a 
component/piece part block.  Therefore, an RBD is primarily a 
simplified design representation of the system being analyzed.  
Since the prediction is based on RBD, which is an inductive 
reliability approach, the system interaction and function 
dependency are usually not explicitly addressed.  The other 
RAP methods include stress-strength interference approach and 
industry standard failure rate databases [9-12].  All these 
methods start from components or sub-systems being designed 
and usually do not explicitly address system interactions and 
interfaces.   
2.3 Reliability Involvement in Design and Development 
Reliability involvement in design and development includes the 
activities of reviewing and incorporating lessons learned into 
design, addressing failure modes and failure causes associated 
with the designs, and using qualitative and quantitative 
reliability data to support design trades, design optimization, 
and risk mitigation and controls [1-3, 10, 12].  For lessons 
learned activity, Reliability Engineers gather and summarize 
lessons learned from past failure analysis reports from similar 
programs and products and present the data to integrated 
product teams (IPTs) throughout all design phases to make sure 
the design will address identified failure modes and causes.  
Reliability Engineers discuss failure mode and cause concerns, 
and lead or facilitate IPT to develop failure mode and cause 
elimination, prevention, and mitigation.  For design trade 
activity, Reliability Engineers provide reliability analyses that 
summarize reliability pros and cons, and rank reliability deltas 
among various candidate/alternative design options to support 
design decisions.  
2.4 Summary of Reliability Tasks 
Besides the reliability tasks discussed above, there are other 
reliability activities and tasks, including reliability program 
plan development, reliability testing and analysis, reliability 
verification, failure analysis and prevention, and reliability 
participation in design reviews.  There are some activities and 
tasks branching out from reliability to support safety, 
maintainability, availability, and warranty analysis.  In 
summary, the reliability tasks are centered around designs, and 
bottom-up and inductive in nature from the design information 
at hand to assess system reliability performance that supports 
designed function achievability.  
3 SAFETY OVERVIEW 
Safety, by its definition, is primarily addressing hazardous 
conditions that may cause personal injury, illness or death, 
damage to the environment, the product, or facilities.  The 
ultimate concerns of safety may not be specific to the product 
design.  Therefore, by nature, safety analyses are top-down, 
starting from a top level hazard event such as fire, explosion, 
personal injury, toxicity, or environment pollution, and trace 
down and link the top level hazard to product design details.  
Typical System Safety tasks include hazard analysis and Fault 
Tree Analysis.  Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), under the 
context of addressing an undesirable system hazard event, is 
also part of a safety analysis.  The following is a brief overview 
of these tasks. 
3.1 Hazard Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
A Hazard Analysis [4] is a systematic analysis of potential 
hazards associated with the system, their causes, and measures 
taken to mitigate the hazards.  The Hazard Analysis is a top-
down and deductive analysis method.  It is initiated early in the 
design phase by identifying a set of top level system hazards 
and forming hazard list based on customer and regulatory 
requirements, public safety concerns, or previous history of 
similar products, and engineering knowledge and judgment.  
The Hazard List is then developed into a Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), which helps to identify safety critical areas 
associated with the system being developed, and establish 
safety design criteria for eliminating, mitigating, and 
controlling the potential hazard causes.  As the design matures, 
the PHA is evolved into the Subsystem Hazard Analysis 
(SSHA) and System Hazard Analysis (SHA), which further 
analyze hazard events and their interactions within the system 
that can produce undesired outcomes, and identify the hazard 
controls and mitigation. 
 
Fault Tree Analysis [13] is a graphical representation of the top 
level hazards traced down to the intermediate failure events, 
then down to the hazard cause as the fault tree basic events.  
Fault Tree Analysis is also a top-down and deductive analysis 
tool.  Fault Tree relationships are described by the fault tree 
Boolean logic with the typical Boolean gates of AND and OR.    
3.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
PRA is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis 
method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex 
technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively 
improving their safety and performance [14-15].  PRA is failure 
scenario based and takes a phenomenological approach to 
address failure risk from its initiating events to an undesirable 
end state, such as loss of a launch vehicle or loss of mission.  
Key elements of PRA include Master Logic Diagram, Event 
Trees or Event Sequence diagrams, and Fault Trees.  The result 
of the PRA is a set of failure scenarios that lead to a set of end 
states, the probability of the end states, as well as uncertainty 
associated with the probability estimates.  PRA helps identify 
the areas where mitigating controls are needed to reduce the risk 
of the undesirable end states.  
3.3 Summary of Safety Tasks 
There are other safety activities and tasks, including safety 
program plan development, safety hazard caution and hazard 
prevention development, safety testing and verification, safety 
participation in design reviews and independent safety review, 
and mishap reporting and investigation.  In summary, safety 
analyses are flowed down from top level hazard concerns and 
undesirable events, taking a top-down approach to link top level 
hazards to the product design details for hazard cause control 
and mitigation.  Safety analysis also addresses sub-system or 
component interactions, interfaces and compounded hazard 
causes. 
4 UNIQUENESS AND UNISON 
4.1 Uniqueness of Reliability and Safety 
4.1.1 Uniqueness in Their Roles 
The role of reliability is to ensure and to assure the achievability 
of functionality of the product.  The role of safety is to ensure 
and assure the system is safe.  Here the word “ensure” 
represents actions to make it happen.  The word “assure” 
represents making claims and stating confidently that it is true. 
Reliability addresses the realization of the functional 
requirements of the components or systems, while Safety 
addresses the identification of system hazard events and their 
controls and mitigations.   It is misleading to equate unreliable 
to unsafe since a top level hazard may or may not be related to 
the component, sub-system, or system design functions.  
Similarly, a failure-to-function may or may not lead to a hazard 
event.  As an example of this distinction, let’s consider a 
consumer product such as ice cream.  The functional 
requirements of an ice cream product can be flavor, taste, color 
and nutritional ingredients, while the safety concern is toxicity.   
Toxicity is not directly affected by the functional requirements 
such as color or flavor of the ice cream.  The role of Reliability 
is to ensure, through design and production, that flavor, taste, 
color, and nutritional ingredients of the ice cream meet their 
specifications.  The role of Safety is to minimize the risk of 
toxicity through a set of hazard cause controls and mitigation 
during the ice cream production and consuming.   
 
For aerospace products such as rocket engines, reliability 
concerns and safety concerns overlap greatly, yet still have their 
own distinct purposes.  In one aspect, the function of a rocket 
engine is to realize a “controlled explosion,” as depicted by a 
Shuttle flight in Figure 1.  Here Reliability is concerned with 
ensuring controllability while Safety is addressing the 
prevention of that explosion becoming uncontrolled.  Another 
example is in the trade-off of single engine design versus 
multiple engine design on a launch vehicle, illustrated in Fig. 2.  
From a reliability viewpoint, the overall function of the engine 
system is to provide adequate thrust to enable mission success.  
A single engine is generally more reliable than multiple engines 
because the single engine has fewer parts, fewer items to fail, 
less integration complexity, and, therefore, a higher probability 
of achieving mission success.  From a safety viewpoint, a key 
objective is to ensure the crew is not harmed during the mission, 
the public is not endangered, and the environment is not 
damaged. While the proper functioning (i.e. reliability) of 
individual components plays a role in overall safe function of 
the system, a vehicle with multiple engines that allows for 
single engine-out capability will likely have a better safety than 
a single-engine configuration that does not have that capability.  
In many industry applications, safety devices are designed and 
implemented to mitigate hazardous conditions.  However, 
components of safety devices, themselves, introduce failure 
modes and failure causes which adversely affect reliability. 
 
Figure 1 Illustration of a “Controlled Explosion” – A Shuttle 
Flight 
 
 
Figure 2 Reliability versus Safety in a Single or Multiple 
Engine Launch Vehicle System 
4.1.2 Uniqueness in Their Requirements 
The role reliability requirements are closed-ended, product 
function specific within the boundary of the design functions.  
All reliability requirements are internally imposed, mirroring 
the functional requirements within the design space.  For 
example, a requirement for a turbopump of a rocket engine is to 
deliver a required delta pressure with a desired probability.  In 
contrast to reliability requirements, safety requirements are 
open-ended, non-function specific such as the statements “no 
fire or explosion,” “no harm to the human being.”   Reliability 
requirements are mostly driven by product functional 
requirements, while safety requirements are driven either by the 
desire to avoid negative customer, user, and societal impacts, or 
by externally imposed constraints, such as regulatory and legal 
policies, and restrictions.   
4.1.3 Uniqueness in Their Approaches 
The reliability approach is primarily bottoms up, starting from 
function statements, or the component or the piece part that is 
designed to realize the intended functions.  The reliability tools 
such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) all start from individual 
component or sub-systems. The FMEA examines, function-by-
function or component-by-component or piece part-by-piece 
part, all credible failure modes and their effects that may impair 
the intended functions.  In contrast to the reliability approach, 
the safety approach is primarily top-down.  Hazard analysis and 
fault tree analysis are typical examples of the safety approach, 
which start from identifying top level hazard events and traces 
down to the lower level triggering events until the bottom basic 
events are exhaustively listed, and controls and mitigations for 
these basic events are established to ensure and to assure safety.  
While the reliability approach is typically looking for 
component failures that lead to an inability to function, the 
safety investigates all conditions that can result in a hazard. 
 
4.1.4 Uniqueness in the Analysis Boundaries 
Safety analysis considers sub-system and component 
interactions and common causes from multiple components and 
sub-systems, while reliability analysis usually only focuses on 
the component or sub-system or the functional element being 
analyzed and assumes all other interacting components are at an 
as-designed and as-built condition. As such, external system 
vulnerability and uncertainty are often not explicitly considered 
in reliability analysis, but may be required to be addressed as 
part of the safety analysis.  History has also shown that there 
were some system accidents [5] where none of the components 
or individual functions within the system failed.  In general, the 
analysis boundary of safety is broader than reliability’s. 
4.2 Unisons of Reliability and Safety 
4.2.1 Unisons in Their Roles 
One common aspect of Safety and Reliability is that both are 
addressing some anomalous and undesirable conditions.  But 
the criteria of anomaly or undesirability can be different, 
although unreliability may often lead to an unsafe condition or 
vice versa.  Both disciplines examine the system and 
component design, development, and operation for their 
possible failures or undesirable events, develop measures to 
gage its success, and propose implementations to achieve its 
respective objectives.  Depending on the product types, the 
roles of Safety and Reliability can be more or less overlapping, 
or can be closely or sometimes directly related, where a failure-
to-function leads to an unsafe condition.  For rocket engine 
products, it is observed that the majority of hazard causes are 
functional failures of certain components or sub-systems. 
Therefore, the roles of Reliability and Safety are heavily 
overlapping. 
4.2.2 Unison in Requirements 
There is more overlap between reliability and safety 
requirements in aerospace products than in consumer products.  
For example, for rocket engines, a loss of mission due to lack 
of thrust is a direct violation of reliability requirement, but it is 
also a safety hazard event since it immediately imposes a higher 
threat to the astronauts’ safety.  For consumer products, such as 
ice cream, as we discussed earlier, reliability and safety 
requirements can be very much non-overlapping.  
4.2.3 Unison in Analysis Methodology, Tools, and Techniques 
There is a central theme in both reliability and safety analysis 
methodology, tools and techniques.  That is to ask “what can go 
wrong?” and “how can we prevent and mitigate that?” As we 
discussed earlier, reliability analysis is primarily bottoms-up, 
while safety analysis is primarily top-down.  Where they meet 
in the middle can be common and overlapping.  For example, 
for rocket engine products, safety hazard analysis identifies top 
level hazard events, then traces these hazard events down to the 
hazard causes through fault trees. Often, those hazard causes 
are the failure modes or associated causes identified in FMEA.  
It is this overlapping and connection that provides opportunity 
for integration and efficiency improvement. Next section will 
discuss linkage of reliability and safety tools, and how safety 
and reliability tools play together to address reliability and 
safety issues. 
4.2.4 The Link of Safety and Reliability – A Space Shuttle 
Case Study  
Given the safety and the reliability discussions above, it is clear 
that safety and reliability engineering are two different areas 
serving different functions in supporting the design and 
operation of launch vehicles. However, safety and reliability 
tools and techniques, in many cases, play together in a 
complementary manner [15]. A good example is the Space 
Shuttle External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
safety assessment, shown in Fig. 3, using probabilistic risk 
assessment process to assess the risk of foam debris hitting the 
Orbiter and leading to a loss of crew (LOC) [16]. Starting from 
the top, the risk assessment, which is simulation based, used the 
ET TPS void distributions derived from the dissection data of 
the ET components under consideration as the initial input. The 
void distributions were then used in a fracture mechanics model 
to generate divots.  The divots generated were then transported 
to evaluate the damage impact on the Orbiter.  The output of the 
model was the probability of Orbiter damage exceeding a 
specified tolerance limit set for the Orbiter. The risk assessment 
model, although limited in scope, was very critical in 
understanding and communicating the safety/risk of the ET 
TPS in flight.  The results of the risk assessment were used as 
part of the rationale to Return-to-Flight (RTF) after the 
Columbia accident [17].  It is important to note that the 
reliability of the foam generation using fracture mechanics was 
a key input to the probabilistic risk assessment.  This 
application represents a good illustration of the complementary 
nature of safety and reliability analyses.  
 
Figure 3 Shuttle ET TPS Foam Risk Assessment Logic 
5 ENHANCEMENTS AND IMPROVEMENTS 
5.1 Enhancing the Roles 
For Safety, the objective is to identify system hazards and 
ensure their causes are controlled. An enhanced role would be 
achieved by determining all of the top level safety requirements 
of the system, directly from customer requirements or derived, 
and establishing clear linkages between the requirements, their 
associated system hazards, and the features of the design or 
process that control the hazards and their causes.  For 
Reliability, the objective is to ensure that a design maximizes 
its probability of performing its intended function.  
Enhancement of reliability role is to focus on a better linkage 
between the function(s) that are needed to be performed by the 
system and its components, and the design solutions being 
incorporated into the design to help maximize functional 
success.   
5.2 Enhancing the Integration 
As we have pointed out, there are opportunities for enhancing 
the integration between Safety and Reliability.  As discussed in 
Section 4, there is an overlap in analysis and data elements 
among the FMEA, reliability prediction, hazard analysis, and 
fault tree analysis.  Reliability and Safety disciplines need to 
define best practices for integrating these analyses to provide 
the best value to the customers, ensuring the analysis results are 
useful, consistent, cohesive, mutually-compensating, and non-
redundant.  Figure 4 is a concept from the Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE) [18] that attempted to integrate 
reliability analysis and safety analysis.  Figure 5 presents an 
integrated reliability and safety modeling approach.   
 
Figure 4 SAE Recommended Reliability and Safety Analysis 
Integration Flow [18] 
 
Figure 5 An Integrated Reliability and Safety Modeling 
Approach 
5.3 Improving Tools 
As part of the integrated reliability and safety approach 
described above, the reliability and safety analysis toolsets also 
need to support this integration.  While the individual 
disciplines will still perform their respective analyses, the tools 
being used need to allow for integration of shared information 
among the FMEA, hazard analysis, reliability modeling and 
prediction, and PRA.  Additionally, the tools should be 
integrated with other engineering discipline tools from Design, 
Systems Engineering, Structural Engineering, Quality, and 
Configuration Management for improved efficiency.       
5.4 Improving Technical and Personal Skills 
As unique roles Reliability and Safety play, the skill set and 
skill levels of Reliability and Safety Engineers need to be 
enhanced in the reliability and safety discipline areas, as well as 
in an IPT environment.  For example, for a Reliability Engineer 
to be successful within an IPT environment to help maximize 
the product functional achievability, the Reliability Engineer 
needs to be knowledgeable about the product designs and be 
familiar with other disciplines’ analyses in order to help 
implement solutions for failure prevention and mitigation. 
Reliability Engineers also need to be open-minded about 
failures.  The definition of the failure can be in a general sense, 
such as failure to assemble, failure to achieve test objectives, 
and failure to meet schedule, etc.  Reliability Engineers need to 
look for opportunities to help IPTs and programs identify, 
prevent, and mitigate the failures with applicable reliability 
tools and techniques. 
 
Safety discipline also needs to cultivate safety experts with 
specialized knowledge on the products your company is 
producing.  The objective is for safety engineers to master the 
knowledge and hands-on skills on the system hazards and 
undesirable events on the product relevant to the appropriate 
regulatory or customer requirements, safety certification 
processes, insurance implications, legal and society 
ramifications, and typical hazard cause controls and mitigation 
methods.  Safety engineers need to address system and 
component interactions, external threats on safety, such as 
vulnerability and uncertainty in operating environments, and 
user application specifics.  
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